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ABSTRACT
Overlaps exist across various doctrines in federal intellectual property law.
Software can be protected under both copyright law and patent law; logos can be
protected under both copyright law and trademark law. Design patents provide a
particular opportunity to consider the issue of overlap, as an industrial design
that qualifies for design patent protection might also, in particular circumstances,
qualify for copyright protection as well as function as protectable trade dress.
When an overlap issue arises—that is, when an intellectual property rights
holder asserts rights under more than one doctrine—the question then becomes
how courts should respond. One response, of course, is that courts should do
nothing, on the theory that the doctrines developed in a way that permit such
overlapping rights, and so the courts should continue to enforce them. The
opposing response is to argue that overlapping rights make it difficult for
intellectual property users to determine the scope of another’s rights, particularly
when those rights have different terms or limitations, and so the courts should
require intellectual property owners to choose the right they want enforced at the
outset.
Neither response is entirely satisfying. Without some signal from Congress
that it intended to limit the scope of intellectual property rights when overlaps
occur, the imposition of restrictions by the courts simply to achieve predictability
for users seems problematic. At the same time, courts should not be blind to the
difficulties that doctrinal overlap pose for potential defendants and the temptation
it presents to intellectual property owners to push for even stronger protection.
* Class of 2014 Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. Many thanks to participants in Stanford Law School’s “Design Patents in the Modern
World” conference (in particular, to commentator Graeme Dinwoodie) as well as
participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Minnesota Law School for helpful
comments. Thanks also to Patrick Berry and Stefan Oehrlein for research assistance, and to
the staff of the Stanford Technology Law Review for thoughtful edits and suggestions.
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This Article therefore proposes something of a middle ground. Courts should
not require intellectual property owners to elect one form of protection at the
outset. But they should be attentive to whether the right asserted in any litigation
proceeding aligns with the harm claimed by the plaintiff and, relatedly, should try
to devise remedies that address only those harms.
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INTRODUCTION
It is nothing new to note that some aspects of commercial activity can be
protected under more than one intellectual property regime. Computer software
can be protected under both copyright law (as a “literary work” comprising
expressive content) and patent law (as a way of solving a particular inventive
problem); some logos or other designs can be protected both under copyright
law (as aesthetically appealing creative works of authorship) and under
trademark law (as transmitters of meaning that indicate the source of goods or
services). Until recently, design patents were the often-ignored child in the
intellectual property family, receiving neither newspaper headlines nor
widespread scholarly attention. But recent high-profile cases, most prominently
the Apple-Samsung dispute, have reawakened practitioners and firms to the
strategic advantages of including design patents in an intellectual property
portfolio. Design patents present a particular opportunity for overlap, in that an
ornamental feature that can be protected by a design patent might also be
protected as a form of expression by copyright law and as a source indicator by
trademark law (in the form of trade dress).
From an intellectual property owner’s perspective, the overlap between or
among regimes is not typically a cause for concern. Seeking protection under
more than one regime is a belt-and-suspenders form of enforcement, allowing
the intellectual property owner to resort to a second mode of protection should
the first fail or expire. But from an intellectual property user’s perspective,
overlapping protection schemes can make it more difficult for competitors to
determine what they can do. Material that is the subject of an expired design
patent, which patent law would put in the public domain, may not be free to use
without restrictions if courts vindicate continuing trade dress rights in that same
material. When this occurs, it is not surprising that an intellectual property user
would feel as if the end of the design patent term has little practical effect.
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Courts could, of course, choose to do nothing on the grounds that since the
doctrines permit an overlap of rights, it would be improper to impose a
limitation. This approach, however, is unsatisfying, as it minimizes very real
concerns about the proper scope of intellectual property protection.
Alternatively, courts could, as some commentators have suggested,1 require
intellectual property owners to elect among doctrines—that is, to choose at the
outset which form of protection they will employ or to relinquish rights in one
form if another is chosen. Requiring the intellectual property owner to elect
among doctrines, however, is difficult to square with the existing federal
intellectual property scheme, in which Congress has contemplated that
overlapping rights will exist. Moreover, requiring commitment to only one
form of protection, whether explicitly or by default, requires careful
consideration of the nature of future uses, income streams, and doctrinal
contours, all of which may be difficult to predict ab initio.
The courts, for their part, have presented what on their face seem to be
mixed messages in this regard. Many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court,
have held that there is no reason to limit intellectual property owners to one
regime—that simply because something is eligible for copyright protection
does not mean that it isn’t also eligible for design patent protection. On the
other hand, many courts—again, including the U.S. Supreme Court—have
rejected attempts by intellectual property owners to assert another form of
intellectual property protection once one form is unavailable for particular
subject matter.2
This Article, therefore, proposes something of a middle ground. Rather
than requiring intellectual property owners to elect among overlapping
intellectual property rights on the front end, courts should address the overlap
concern by being more attentive to harms and remedies on the back end. In
other words, the fact that something qualifies for protection under a particular
intellectual property doctrine does not mean that, in any particular case, the IP
1. See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations and
the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471, 476 (1998) (“Permitting
plaintiffs to rely on § 43(a) to prevent the copying of product features creates a distinct
tension with Congress’ plan in enacting the patent and copyright laws.”); Mark P. McKenna,
An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 891 (2009)
(suggesting, although recognizing the difficulties in the proposal, that firms be required “to
elect between forms of protection at the product level”—for example, between patent
protection for a pharmaceutical and trademark protection for the brand name for the
pharmaceutical); Matthew Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 79,
85-86 n.23 (1967) (describing the “fundamentally sound view that the creator might have an
election between the two forms of protection” but noting that “the federal protective scheme
never intended double protection; if one desires the long-term protection against plagiarizers
one must be willing to give up one’s ‘idea’ to the public; if one wants a total monopoly over
any use of the design, one must be satisfied with the terms and conditions of the design
patent statute”).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 33-128.
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owner is entitled to a particular remedy. The appropriateness of a remedy
depends on whether it is tailored to the harm incurred. For example, not every
injury involving a work subject to a design patent requires an injunction
forbidding use altogether; if the real harm results from the representations made
in connection with that use, a narrower injunction, viewed through the lens of
unfair competition law, might be all that is necessary.
This approach is not an unfamiliar one. In the copyright and patent realms,
courts have been willing to term an assertion of rights “misuse” when the
underlying harm is unrelated to the core interests of the intellectual property
doctrine. And in other areas of the law, such as defamation, courts have refused
to allow plaintiffs to avoid restrictions posed by the First Amendment and
statutes of limitations simply by renaming their legal claims. In all of these
cases, courts have solved the problem of overlapping doctrines by looking
beyond the label attached to the claim to inquire more deeply about harms and
remedies.
To be clear, by suggesting the same approach in intellectual property cases,
I am not suggesting that IP owners who assert overlapping rights are
necessarily engaging in malfeasance. If two forms of protection are both
available for a single article, it is not automatically unlawful or duplicitous to
assert both. At the same time, however, courts should not provide
sledgehammer remedies to redress fly-sized harms.
I.

OVERLAPS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

The current condition of overlap in intellectual property law results both
from the multifaceted nature of many articles of creation or invention and from
an expansion of the various doctrines beyond their more limited origins.
For example, both the subject matter of design patents and the subject
matter of copyright law generally concern items with aesthetic appeal for their
intended audience and exclude from their scope items that are useful or
functional (as does trademark law), leaving protection of useful items to the
utility patent regime. Thus, it is possible for a single design to be subject both
to the lengthy term of copyright law and to the considerably shorter term of
design patent law. Similarly, because both design patent law and trade dress
law base their rights on the relevant audience’s appreciation or understanding
of the distinctiveness of a particular design, it is possible for a single design
both to satisfy the novelty requirement of design patent law and the secondary
meaning requirement of trade dress law and thus to be subject both to the
limited term of protection of design patent law as well as the potentially
unlimited term of protection of trade dress law.
The nature of the overlap has been augmented by an expansion and
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morphing of the boundaries of the various doctrines.3 Copyright’s early focus
on works of fine art (once it moved beyond its original scope of books, maps,
and charts) would not initially have posed any risk of doctrinal overlap with
design patent law, which was contemplated to extend only to works of
industrial design.4 As copyright’s scope expanded away from fine art toward
encompassing works of authorship with potential commercial uses, however,
the overlap between copyright’s realm and that of design patent increased. The
1909 Copyright Act described the subject matter of copyright as “all the
writings of an author,” without any specific reference to the fine arts,5 and by
1917, the Copyright Office had amended its regulations to allow registration of
“artistic drawings not withstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles
of manufacture,” with a further amendment in 1949 to allow registration of
“published or unpublished works or artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form
but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.”6
In the courts, the turning point was Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., in which the Court held that copyright protection could not be denied to
the artwork featured in a circus advertisement merely because the art was being
used toward commercial rather than purely aesthetic ends.7 Thus, the scope of
copyright no longer turned on whether a work of authorship furthered
knowledge or existed in the rarefied air of the fine arts; rather, so long as the
work met minimal requirements of creativity and originality, it could be

3. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1496 (2004)
(“[O]verlapping protection has arisen mostly by accretion, as a result of the expansion of
intellectual property rights, rather than by design.”); see also id. at 1511-12 (discussing
overlap of design patent rights with both copyright and trademark).
4. Protection was extended to “painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of
models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts” in 1870. Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916); Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and
Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV.
707, 710 (1983). In the 1909 Copyright Act, protection was afforded to “[w]orks of art;
models or designs for works of art,” without any reference to the fine arts. Copyright Act of
1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976); Denicola, supra, at 710; see also
Gregory R. Mues, Dual Copyright and Design Patent Protection: Works of Art and
Ornamental Designs, 49 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 557 (1975) (“At the time the first design
patent legislation was enacted, copyright protection was reserved to works of purely
intellectual or fine art value. On the other hand, the existing mechanical patent statutes were
devoted to the furtherance and protection of industrial advancement. Thus, since the purpose
of applied designs was commercial enterprise, it was reasonable that regulation fall under the
patent laws.” (footnote omitted)).
5. § 4, 35 Stat. at 1076; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 (1954).
6. Denicola, supra note 4, at 710-11 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1917) and 37
C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1949)); see also Barton Beebe, Bleistein, Copyright Law, and the
Problem of Aesthetic Progress 30-35 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (tracing
the history of the Copyright Act).
7. 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).

244

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:239

protected, even if the work was being deployed to overtly commercial ends.8
And because copyright infringement now can be shown not merely with nearidentical copying but with works that are “substantially similar” to the
copyrighted work, it is more difficult to draw clean lines between copyright law
and design patent. So while a commentator could write in 1975 that, assuming
an antique telephone casing was protected both by design patent and by
copyright, “[u]pon the expiration of the design patent, the design would be free
for public use,” and that “[t]he remaining copyright would only protect the
owner from the slavish copying of his antique casing and any noticeable
variation in a similar casing would foreclose a copyright infringement claim,”9
such an assertion would be unsupported by modern case law.
Design patents saw a similar expansion. Congress originally enacted design
patent law in response to a belief that the design of industrial articles, in
addition to their functional aspects, should be encouraged and protected from
commercial copying. Such protection had been available in France and England
in the 1700s, and it was the perceived comparative disadvantage of the United
States in this regard that Commission of Patents Henry Ellsworth highlighted in
his 1841 report to Congress, noting, “Competition among manufacturers for the
latest patterns prompts to the highest effort to secure improvements, and calls
out the inventive genius of our citizens.”10 Congress responded by enacting the
first law in the U.S. to protect industrial design.11 As was said of a 1902
amendment, the law was intended to provide protection for “objects of new and
artistic quality pertaining . . . to commerce,” as opposed to the “objects of art”
protected by copyright law and the “mechanical constructions possessing utility
of mechanical function” protected by utility patents.12
The precise assumptions underlying the enactment are unclear.
Presumably, there is something of the incentive theory that is the dominant
justification in the U.S. for patent law and copyright law: that authors and
inventors will be disinclined to bring their works and inventions forth if second
comers can easily copy their works and then sell them in the market for the
marginal cost of copying (i.e., without the need to recoup the costs of
8. Mues, supra note 4, at 561 (“[Bleistein’s] judicial inroad of the copyright into the
commercial sphere, previously occupied solely by the design patent, provided a significant
step forward in the ultimate realization of dual coverage.”); see also Beebe, supra note 6, at
38-43 (discussing Bleistein’s principle of aesthetic neutrality).
9. See Mues, supra note 4, at 567 (discussing Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
10. HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 27-74, at 2 (2d Sess. 1841), quoted in Thomas B. Hudson, A Brief History of the
Development of Design Patent Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT OFF. SOC’Y 380,
380 (1948).
11. See Design Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44.
12. S. REP. NO. 57-1139, at 3 (1902) (statement of Commissioner of Patents Frederick
Innes Allen), quoted in Hudson, supra note 10, at 390-91.
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development or invention). On this theory, design patents are ultimately
justified as benefiting the public, which enjoys an increase in the aesthetically
pleasing character of industrial goods that would not otherwise exist. There is
also probably something of a fairness or other moral concern regarding copying
the work of others without having engaged in the toil of authorship or
invention. Here, the benefit of the law is contemplated for the designer, not the
public: prohibiting misappropriation and unlawful free riding, as well as a
valorization of industrial design as a cousin to fine art and mechanical
inventions. Thus, as one commentator wrote:
The articles themselves may have been of common usage and knowledge, e.g.,
spoons or forks, and therefore not worthy of a mechanical patent, which at one
time was the sole protection available. Yet, the manufacturer of these
implements may have used his inventive genius in designing their shape,
configuration, or ornamentation so as to present an attractive article for sale.
Nevertheless, since the designer of these ornate utensils was without statutory
protection, his design could be freely copied by others less talented. The
designer was thereby deprived of the fruits of his labor. 13

Despite the initial goal of providing protection only for aesthetically
appealing articles of manufacture, later court decisions resulted in a more
expansive scope of design patent law. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, in its 1930 decision in In re Koehring, reversed a decision by the
Commissioner of Patents denying a design patent for a concrete mixer truck
body and frame.14 While the Commissioner, and the dissent, believed that such
items were not contemplated to be the subject of design patents (as opposed to
objects with more understandable aesthetic appeal), the majority held that “the
beauty and ornamentation requisite in design patents is not confined to such as
may be found in the ‘esthetic or fine arts.’”15 Thus, by the mid-twentieth
century, it was established that both copyright protection and design patent
protection extended to works with uses in the commercial realm with some
degree of aesthetic appeal, regardless of whether that appeal could be said to be
refined.
The expansion of trademark law’s protection to encompass product design
trade dress (as opposed to merely product packaging), as well as the expansion
of liability to include not only uses of the plaintiff’s mark that diverted
consumers from the plaintiff to the defendant but also uses that suggested a
13. Mues, supra note 4, at 555-56 (footnote omitted); see also Sarah Burstein, Visual
Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 172 (2012) (“The decorative arts differ from the
fine arts primarily in the constraints imposed upon the designer’s creative expression.”).
14. 37 F.2d 421, 421, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
15. Id. at 422 (noting that Congress, in enacting design patent law, “expressed a desire
to promote more beauty, grace, and ornamentation in things used, observed, and enjoyed by
our people,” and “had in mind the elimination of much of the unsightly repulsiveness that
characterizes many machines and mechanical devices which have a tendency to depress
rather than excite the esthetic sense”).
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sponsorship or authorization relationship also contributed to the overlap
between trademark law and design patents.16 As with the copyright/design
interface, the trademark/design overlap emanated from broad statutory
language (here, in the Lanham Act) that courts took at face value. The language
of the Lanham Act, the Court declared in Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Products
Co., “says that trademarks ‘include any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.’ Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’
almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read
literally, is not restrictive.”17 Given this broad reading, there is nothing in the
Lanham Act itself that prevents extension of trademark protection to product
configurations as a category, save for the exclusion of functional subject
matter, which is left to the realm of utility patents.18 Thus, similarly to the
commentator discussed above, where a commentator in 1967 could plausibly
write that the trademark and design patent overlap was in one respect narrow
because, even when a design patent on a decanter expired, trademark law
would not prevent its use “in contexts other than the sale of liquor,”19 federal
trademark law has since moved far from that limited scope.
Thus, on a broad view, the various intellectual property regimes present
significant areas of overlap. But when we look at the particular interests at the
core of each doctrine, differences do emerge. For example, although both
copyright law and design patent law concern aesthetics, and are both
constitutionally concerned with promoting “progress,” the two regimes have
different views of when progress has been achieved. Because copyright law has
no novelty requirement, unlike design patent law, it is difficult to say that it has
any real concern with advancement in aesthetics. As Barton Beebe has noted,
copyright law’s theory is that the more works that are encouraged, the more
likely it is that we will end up with something worthwhile.20 Design patent law,
16. J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States
Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 125 (1989) (“[T]he
federal appellate courts generally have expanded the protection of product configurations as
‘appearance trade dress’ under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, with the result that its
anticompetitive thrust may actually exceed that of state unfair competition laws prior to the
Sears-Compco decisions of 1964.”).
17. 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2011) (providing basis for refusal of registration for a
mark that “comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2001) (noting that although “[i]t is well
established that trade dress can be protected under federal law,” trade dress protection “may
not be claimed for product features that are functional”).
19. Nimetz, supra note 1, at 90.
20. Beebe, supra note 6, at 47 (“[H]ow can copyright law claim to promote progress,
aesthetic or otherwise, when it has no progress-based standard for copyrightability? . . . More
copyright protection will generate more expression, goes the argument, and some of this
expression, we trust, will promote aesthetic progress, be that progress in the form of more
pleasingly diverse expression, more pleasingly beautiful expression, or simply more pleasing
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by contrast, is focused on encouraging advances in design. By requiring
novelty, it is concerned with progress in a more linear sense: the development
of the practice of design over time.21
Neither design patent nor trade dress rights, to take another overlap, exist
without some engagement with an audience: the examiner at the Patent and
Trademark Office who deems the design novel or the relevant group of
consumers who recognize the trade dress as distinctive. However, unlike design
patents, trademark law is not concerned with the aesthetic reaction to a design
but rather with the denotative meaning attached to that design. Trademark law
does not reward aesthetic appeal or any conception of whether the development
of the trademark promotes any sort of progress in the useful arts; a trademark is
simply a sign that substitutes for a larger collection of information about the
source of a particular good or service.
All three regimes overlap in the sense that audience or consumer reaction is
the touchstone for infringement. But audience reaction presents more of an
overlap concern at the copyright/design patent interface than it does at the other
two interfaces.22 Infringement of a design patent “requires that the designs have
the same general visual appearance, such that it is likely that the purchaser
would be deceived into confusing the design of the accused article with the
patent design.”23 For both copyright infringement and design patent
infringement, then, the test is whether the ordinary observer would find the
plaintiff’s work or invention and the defendant’s work or invention the same,
taking into account the unprotectable elements of the subject matter.24 Because
expression.”).
21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“The dichotomy of protection for the
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and
ornamental design for design patents”); Mues, supra note 4, at 572 (“[T]he aspects protected
by the copyright and design patent are distinct. For the copyright, it is original pure art
divorced from any utilitarian embodiment, while for the design patent, it is inventive artistic
ornamentation applied to commercial endeavor.”).
22. I have already considered the copyright/trademark overlap in Laura A. Heymann,
The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 90-93 (2007).
23. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 162 F.3d 1113,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
24. Compare Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872) (design
patents) (“We hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such
attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the
resemblance is such as to deceive an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to
be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”), and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (design patents) (holding that the
test for design patent infringement is whether the ordinary observer would find the two
designs to be substantially the same, in light of the prior art), with Harney v. Sony Pictures
Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 179 (9th Cir. 2013) (copyright) (“We have explained that two
works are substantially similar [for purposes of a copyright infringement analysis] if [the]
‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.’” (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v.
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both regimes are directed, at least in the United States, toward protection of the
IP owner’s economic interests, the similarity test is meant to determine whether
the defendant’s work or invention serves as a substitute in the market for the
plaintiff’s.25 This makes sense in both regimes because the appeal of the
subject matter to the audience’s aesthetic perception is what defines the nature
of the subject matter and, presumably, motivates its creation. This analysis does
not, of itself, concern itself with the consumer’s understanding as to the source
of the goods. That is, one commits copyright or design patent infringement
simply by copying the protected subject matter, regardless of whether that
subject matter is recognizable to consumers as the work of the rights holder or
whether it is presented as the work of the copier.26
In a trademark infringement case, consumer reaction and similarity are also
the touchstones, although the ultimate inquiry is different. Here, the question is
whether the plaintiff’s good or service and the defendant’s good or service are
presented as deriving from the same source or are otherwise related when they
in fact are not. Contrary to copyright law and design patent law, which prohibit
unauthorized similarity between two sets of goods, trademark law prohibits
false declarations of similarity between two sets of goods, as expressed through
the use of the trademark. Indeed, if the two sets of goods are in fact the same—
the defendant is using the Louis Vuitton trademark to sell a genuine Louis
Vuitton handbag, for example—there should be no trademark infringement at
all.
Thus, it is not necessarily the case that something protected by a design
patent will also function as a source indicator and thus be potentially
protectable as trade dress, although it is more likely that this will occur with
design patents as compared with utility patents. There are many patented
inventions installed internally in the typical computer or television, but because
none of them are visible to the consumer, their appearance is unlikely to be
used as a way of conveying information about the source of the good. Design
patents, however, present a greater possibility of overlap because the heart of a
Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988))).
25. See, e.g., Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(describing the similarity in a patent infringement case as “market confusion”).
26. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has described design patent infringement in
terms that sound very much like trademark infringement. In Gorham, the Court wrote:
It is persons of [ordinary intelligence] who are the principal purchasers of the articles to
which designs have given novel appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase
what is not the article they supposed it to be, if, for example, they are led to purchase forks or
spoons, deceived by an apparent resemblance into the belief that they bear the ‘cottage’
design, and, therefore, are the production of the holders of the Gorham, Thurber, and Dexter
patent, when in fact they are not, the patentees are injured, and that advantage of a market
which the patent was granted to secure is destroyed.

Id. at 528. It would seem that the deception of the consumer should not matter at all to
design patents, as the patent would be equally infringed if the consumer were fully aware
that the manufacturer of the second item was not the plaintiff.
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design patent is something that is visible and appreciated by the consumer. To
the extent the subject of a design patent has value because of its ornamentation,
it may also serve as a source indicator in that it simultaneously indicates to the
consumer who is responsible for the pleasing design.
The fact that design patents and trade dress are directed at different types
of consumer reaction does not mean that the two are less likely to be asserted
concurrently or sequentially than design patent and copyright. Indeed, as a
practical matter, the assertion of concurrent or sequential design patent
protection and trade dress protection is more likely to arise than the similar
assertion of design patent and copyright. As Sarah Burstein has written, if the
design at issue is solely an applied design (in other words, essentially sits on
top of and is conceptually separable from the underlying product), it is likely to
be protectable by copyright law as well as by a design patent.27 Given the
longer term and cheaper cost of acquisition of copyright protection, as well as
the fact that copyrighted matter is protected from the time of fixation, rather
than only after examination, an IP owner could reasonably choose not to
undergo the expense of design patent acquisition if it could achieve protection
via copyright law.28 By contrast, because trade dress protection for product
design attaches only once the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning in
the marketplace, a process that could take a year or more, an IP owner might be
more motivated to seek a design patent at the outset of the design’s release to
the market, particularly when (as is reportedly the case at present) the time span
for design patent acquisition is on the order of months.29

27. Burstein, supra note 13, at 174 n.25 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a rational designer would incur the cost of obtaining a design patent for a design
directed solely to surface ornamentation.”); see also Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent
Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273840 (arguing for bright-line rule
that industrial design should not be protected at all by copyright law because “if there is
uncertainty, industrial designers are likely to pursue copyright protection rather than
patent”).
28. Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
887, 894-95 (writing in 1988 that “[f]or most designs, standard of invention is too high, the
time required to obtain [design patent] protection too long, and the expense and bother of
doing so too great in view of the probable returns”). As with other rapidly developing
copyrightable subject matter, such as software, it is unclear how often copyright protection
can be usefully invoked after the first few years of protection.
29. Design Patents Are Still Relatively Quick, PATENTLY-O, (Jan. 20, 2013, 6:29 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/design-patents-are-still-relatively-quick.html
(“[T]he bulk of design patents are issued within 12-months of the filing date and only a
handful take more than three years to issue. . . . [M]ost design patents are issued without
substantive rejection or amendment.”).
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ENFORCING OVERLAPPING IP RIGHTS

The availability of more than one form of intellectual property protection
for a single subject matter might be beneficial for an intellectual property
owner but it poses some difficulty for those who are concerned about liability
for unauthorized use. An entity that copies another’s design, for example,
cannot be confident that it is on safe ground if it ensures that it satisfies
copyright law’s fair use defense if the article is also protected by design patent
law, which contains no fair use defense. If the design also functions as a
company logo, further complications are raised given that fair use under the
Lanham Act exists only in a limited number of narrow (and contested) statutory
provisions, supplemented by vague First Amendment-related doctrines that
have developed in the courts.30
The different terms for each regime also raise concerns about use of the
subject matter once the protections of a particular regime expire. For example,
the design patent term in the United States is currently fourteen years.31 Once
that term expires, design patent doctrine presumes that anyone is free to make
the design that was the subject matter of the design patent. If that design is also
protected by trade dress, however, and the design is still in use by the entity
claiming trademark rights in it, the use of the design by a competitor might be
alleged to be trade dress infringement.
It is for these reasons that some commentators have suggested that
intellectual property owners be required to elect among regimes at the outset or,
relatedly, to be held to the requirements of the regime whose protections expire
first.32 In the case of a design patent, where either copyright law or trademark
law would also apply, those rights would expire at the same time as the
expiration of the design patent rights, as the design patent carries the shortest
term. This proposal presents several complications. First, a doctrine of election
is unlikely to be implemented by the same judicial system that participated in
the expansion of intellectual property regimes discussed above. Additionally, a
rule that held that intellectual property protections in overlap situations last
only as long as the shortest term suffers from a similar lack of grounding in the
doctrine and does nothing to solve the overlap problem during that term.
30. See generally William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49 (2008); William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2267 (2010).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2011) (“Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of
fourteen years from the date of grant.”). But see Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, § 102(7), 126 Stat. 1527, 1532 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 173 “by
striking ‘fourteen years’ and inserting ‘15 years’”).
32. See supra note 1. Relatedly, several commentators have suggested amending the
law so as to eliminate the overlap, such as eliminating copyright protection for “works of
artistic craftsmanship.” See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for Designs, 19
U. BALT. L. REV. 308, 321 (1989).
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Moreover, it is unlikely that supporters of such a proposal would require a
company that abandoned commercial use of a novel design to give up its design
patent rights because it could no longer assert trade dress rights.
In order to explain why a remedies-focused approach is the preferred
solution, I begin with an overview of judicial reactions to overlapping
intellectual property regimes. As the next Subparts will show, courts take
different views on the appropriateness of the overlap, depending on whether the
issue is the existence of the right in the first instance or the assertion of the right
in a later infringement suit.
A. Establishing Overlapping Rights
Earlier decisions held that the owner of subject matter that could qualify
either for a design patent or for copyright protection must elect one regime at
the time of registration. In each of these cases, the overlap question arose either
as the result of an attempt to register rights when one set of rights had already
been registered or as the result of an attempt to challenge the acquisition of
rights as improper given the subject matter.
In Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., a 1910 circuit court
case, the defendant attempted to defend against copyright infringement of the
plaintiff’s painting of holly, mistletoe, and spruce arranged in a square by
arguing that the painting was created and intended for use on wrapping paper
and so should have been limited to protection under design patent law.33 The
court rejected this argument, noting that, post-Bleistein, the design qualified for
copyright protection and so “could not be definitely assigned for the present
purpose either to the fine or to the useful arts, until the author or the owner
decided under which statute he would protect his property.”34 But, the court
cautioned, “it could not enter both,” since “[t]he method of procedure, the term
of protection, and the penalties for infringement, are so different that the author
or owner of a painting that is eligible for both classes must decide to which
region of intellectual effort the work is to be assigned, and he must abide by the
decision.”35 The question of election, however, was not directly presented in
the case (and so the court’s comments were dicta), as the case involved only
“whether a painting possessing artistic merit, but suitable also for use as a
design, may at the owner’s election be protected either by copyright or by
patent.”36
In re Blood, a 1927 appellate case, held similarly, as it affirmed the Patent
Office’s refusal of a design patent registration for the shape of a ticket in light

33.
34.
35.
36.

182 F. 150, 151 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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of the applicant’s existing trademark registration of the same design, with text,
as a label for its goods.37 “The design is not entitled to double registration, once
as a label design, and again as a design for a hosiery ticket,” held the court.38
Such a course would result for all practical purposes in an extension of the
design monopoly. The applicant was entitled to apply for a patent for the
design as a hosiery label, or he might complete the label, and register the
design, so completed, as a label. He could not do both. He elected to pursue
the latter course, and has obtained the protection thereby assured to him, and
he is bound by that election.39

By the mid-twentieth century, however, the view of the courts on
concurrent rights changed. In Mazer v. Stein, a 1954 Supreme Court opinion,
the plaintiff had secured a copyright in statuettes that it intended to mass
produce as lamp bases.40 The defendants, who had copied the statuettes without
authorization for their own lamps, defended against a copyright infringement
suit, as the defendant did in De Jonge, by alleging that the plaintiff’s
“publication as a lamp and registration as a statue to gain a monopoly in
manufacture” constituted a misuse of copyright law and that the plaintiff should
instead be limited to a design patent.41 The Court, having held that the
statuettes were copyrightable,42 declined to assess whether the statuettes could
also be protected by a design patent. But even if they could, the Court held, this
did not render the plaintiff’s use of copyright law illegitimate: “[T]he
patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright
as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a
thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold.”43 The
Court further held that this principle applied whether the copyright registration
took place before or after the work was embodied in the useful article; such
registration did not, the Court asserted, constitute copyright misuse.44
Because the Mazer Court did not have to decide whether the statuettes
were also protected by design patent, it did not reach the question of
overlapping regimes. Subsequent cases in the lower courts, however, rejected
the argument that an intellectual property owner, having availed itself of one
regime, should be barred from acquiring rights under another regime.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
Id.
Id.
347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954).
Id. at 206; see also id. at 216 (“Petitioner urges that overlapping of patent and
copyright legislation so as to give an author or inventor a choice between patents and
copyrights should not be permitted.”).
42. Id. at 213-14. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, questioned whether this was an
appropriate conclusion. See id. at 219-21 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 217 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 218-19.
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In In re Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., a 1964 Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals case, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) had
refused to grant Mogen David Wine Corporation a trademark registration on
the Principal Register for a wine decanter, as the plaintiff was already the
owner (by assignment) of a design patent for the same decanter.45 In its 1959
decision in In re The Pepsi-Cola Co., the TTAB had held that the existence of a
design patent for a spirally-fluted bottle for carbonated beverages did not
preclude the registration of the bottle on the Supplemental Register.46
Congress, the TTAB held, clearly contemplated the use of the Supplemental
Register to receive trademark protection in foreign countries, even during the
term of a design patent.47 Reconciling its decision in the Pepsi-Cola case, the
TTAB had held in Mogen David Wine that because registration on the
Supplemental Register afforded the owner no presumptions of exclusive use,
there was no risk of extending the monopoly enjoyed under the design patent.48
Registration on the Principal Register, by contrast, would “be inimical to the
rights of others conditioned under the patent grant to make fair use of the
subject matter after expiration of the patent.”49 But the CCPA rejected this
argument on appeal:
[T]rademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair competition, which
happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not ‘extend’
the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law and
for different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on the
continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The
trademark rights do not extend it. We know of no provision of patent law,
statutory or otherwise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the
subject matter of any expired patent. Patent expiration is nothing more than
the cessation of the patentee’s right to exclude held under the patent law.
Conversely, trademarks conceivably could end through non use during the life
of a patent. We doubt it would be argued that the patent rights should also
expire so as not to “extend” them.50

In In re Yardley,51 a 1974 case from the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the court once again addressed the doctrinal overlap question, this
time as to design patent and copyright. The applicant sought a design patent for
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

328 F.2d 925, 926 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
Id.
Mogen David Wine, 328 F.2d at 927.
Id.
Id. at 930; see also id. at 928 (“As a manufacturer, one may make any unpatented
article, but as a vendor, he may be restricted in the interest of fair competition.” (quoting 1
HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 390 (4th ed. 1947)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Commentators have identified Yardley as the case
in which courts broke with a prior history of requiring election. See, e.g., Mues, supra note
4, at 543.

254

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:239

the ornamental design for a watch face (featuring a caricature of Spiro Agnew
in which the arms and hands served as the hands of the watch). The examiner
rejected the claim both on obviousness grounds and on estoppel grounds, given
three existing copyright registrations for the same design, and that rejection was
affirmed by the Patent Office Board of Appeals.52 On appeal, the court held
that the existing copyright registrations should not themselves be a bar to
obtaining design patent protection. First, the court noted, Congress must have
intended there to be an overlap between statutory subject matter in copyright
and statutory subject matter in design patent because the statutory provisions as
to eligible subject matter facially admitted of such overlap.53 Second, the court
concluded, requiring election between the two doctrines would therefore be “in
direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress manifested in the two statutory
provisions,”54 because Congress did not indicate a need to elect between the
two doctrines in cases of overlapping eligibility.55
Such cases led the Seventh Circuit in its 1993 opinion in Kohler Co. v.
Moen, Inc., to conclude that courts had generally held that “a product’s
different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more
than one of the statutory means for protection of intellectual property.”56 The
case involved claims to both trade dress rights and design patent rights over
faucet and faucet handle designs. Kohler, the defendant, contended that trade
dress rights in product configurations were impermissible because intellectual
property rights in industrial design should be the sole domain of design patents;
to accord trade dress rights in configurations, Kohler argued, would
impermissibly extend the patent term.57 The Seventh Circuit rejected that
argument, noting that because “[t]rademark protection is dependent only on
public reaction to the trademark in the marketplace rather than solely on the
similarity of the configurations,” the two regimes were conceptually and legally
distinct.58 Put otherwise, “[a] design patent gives the patentee a virtually
absolute monopoly in the design, while a trademark allows competitive uses of
a protected design so long as such uses do not create consumer confusion.”59
The court held that Kohler was “free to copy Moen’s design so long as it

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1390-92.
Id. at 1394.
Id.
By 1995, the Copyright Office had also come around to the idea that there was “no
longer any legal justification” for refusing copyright registration to elements of pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works for which a design patent had been issued. See Registrability
of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent Has Been Issued, 60 Fed.
Reg. 15605 (Copyright Office Mar. 24, 1995) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 202.10).
56. 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 637.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 638 n.8.
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insures that the public is not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its
copy is a Moen faucet.”60 Notably, as it was reacting only to the argument that
acquisition of overlapping rights was impermissible, the court did not need to
reach the question of enforcement—in other words, whether the mere copying
of Moen’s faucet would be sufficient grounds for concluding that the public
would be “confused into believing that [Kohler’s] copy is a Moen faucet.”61 (I
address this question later.)62
Finally, although it was not the focus of the opinion, the Supreme Court
lent its voice in 2000 to the chorus of courts finding no doctrinal issue with
simultaneous intellectual property rights. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc., the plaintiff had claimed that the design of its children’s dresses
was protectable trade dress and that Wal-Mart had engaged in trademark
infringement by commissioning a manufacturer to produce dresses featuring a
similar design.63 The question in the case was whether the design of a product
could be deemed inherently distinctive (and thus protectable as a mark ab
initio) or whether the plaintiff should have to show that the design functioned
as a source indicator by providing proof of acquired meaning. In holding that
product design could not be inherently distinctive, and that proof that the
design had acquired a source-identifying meaning was required,64 the Court
specifically highlighted the ability of the designer to turn to other intellectual
property regimes for protection before acquired meaning could be developed:
Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but by the
plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently
source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle. That is especially so
since the producer can ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is
inherently source identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have
secondary meaning, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the
design—as, indeed, respondent did for certain elements of the designs in this
case. The availability of these other protections greatly reduces any harm to
the producer that might ensue from our conclusion that a product design
cannot be protected under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning.65

60. Id. at 640 n.10; see also Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955,
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting and construing Kohler, 12 F.2d at 638, 640 n.10).
61. Kohler, 12 F.2d at 640 n.10; cf. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS.
L. REV. 823, 844 (2011) (calling the court’s assertion that Kohler was free to copy Moen’s
design “remarkably disingenuous, for the effect of trade dress protection was to deny Kohler
the ability to copy Moen’s design for the purpose of competing with Moen in the market for
faucets”).
62. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
63. 529 U.S. 205, 207-08 (2000).
64. See id. at 216.
65. Id. at 214. But see Nimetz, supra note 1, at 90 (“[T]he statutory monopoly granted
by the [design] patent is intended to give the producer time to recover his development costs;
it is not intended to supply a period in which to develop consumer association of the design
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The Court thus contemplated that an IP owner might successfully, and
properly, invoke all three regimes for an inherently distinctive design:
copyright or design patent at the outset of the design’s use, and trademark law
once the design had spent enough time in the marketplace to acquire meaning
as a source identifier.
B. Enforcing Overlapping Rights
Taken together, the cases discussed in the previous section establish the
view of the federal courts that there is no threshold restriction on acquiring
overlapping intellectual property rights for the same subject matter, provided
that the requirements of each regime are met. These cases do not, however,
dictate to what extent a particular intellectual property right will be enforced in
any particular case, an issue that obviously cannot be resolved without taking
the interests of the putative defendant into account.
One of these interests is the ability to use the subject matter of the
intellectual property right once the term of protection has ended. In patent and
copyright law cases, this interest is often expressed in the contractual terms of a
quid pro quo: that implicit in the grant of the limited monopoly is a return
promise to dedicate the subject matter of the grant to the public domain after
the expiration of the term. The argument is made most strongly in patent cases.
As the Supreme Court stated in Grant v. Raymond in 1832:
[I]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever
been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inventions an
exclusive right in their inventions for the time mentioned in their patent. It is
the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by the public for the exertions
of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. The laws
which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, we think, to be
construed in the spirit in which they have been made; and to execute the
contract fairly on the part of the United States, where the full benefit has been
actually received: if this can be done without transcending the intention of the
statute, or countenancing acts which are fraudulent or may prove mischievous.
The public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all
which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery, after its
enjoyment by the discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved; and for his
exclusive enjoyment of it during that time the public faith is pledged.66

with the producer so that it will qualify as a trademark.”).
66. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832). The Court continued the contract analogy
later in the opinion, in which it considered whether an error in the patent could be corrected
and the patent reissued for the remainder of the existing term, or whether the error rendered
the patent invalid:
The communication of the discovery to the public has been made in pursuance of law, with
the intent to exercise a privilege which is the consideration paid by the public for the future
use of the machine. If, by an innocent mistake, the instrument introduced to secure this
privilege fails in its object, the public ought not to avail itself of this mistake, and to
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Likewise, the Court stated in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.,
Inc., in 1945 that “the means adopted by Congress of promoting the progress of
science and the arts is the limited grant of the patent monopoly in return for the
full disclosure of the patented invention and its dedication to the public on the
expiration of the patent.”67
There are, of course, two ways this “bargain” can be characterized.68 On
one view, the bargain is simply a grant of a number of years of protection in
exchange for the disclosure of the invention to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (and thus, upon publication, to the world). When the disclosure has
occurred and the years have run, each party has fulfilled its obligations under
the agreement. On another view, however, the patentee’s consideration is twofold: in exchange for the limited monopoly, the patentee must not only disclose
the invention to the public but also agree to forego any other legal rights that
might attach to the invention as against the public after the expiration of the
term. The latter view thus works as a doctrine of election of sorts, in that it tells
the patentee that if it elects to participate in the patent system, it is giving up the
right to assert other intellectual property rights as against the public after the
patent term expires; it has, put differently, given the public an unfettered “right
to copy” the subject matter of the patent.69
Two related aspects of this argument merit closer consideration. First, we
might query whether the quid pro quo argument has the same force in the

appropriate the discovery without paying the stipulated consideration.

Id. at 244; see also Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (patent law “was
passed for the purpose of encouraging useful invention and promoting new and useful
improvements by the protection and stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was
intended to secure to the public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges granted, the
benefit of such inventions and improvements”).
67. 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); see also id. at 256 (“By the force of the patent laws not
only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the public upon its expiration, but the public
thereby becomes entitled to share in the good will which the patentee has built up in the
patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent monopoly. Hence we have
held that the patentee may not exclude the public from participating in that good will or
secure, to any extent, a continuation of his monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and
registering as a trademark any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications,
drawings, or claims of the expired patent, whether or not such matter describes essential
elements of the invention or claims.”).
68. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:
Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 247 n.92 (Jane C.
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (discussing various theories as to the
“terms and conditions of the bargain”).
69. Cf. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“The right to copy is even more robust when the copied product was previously patented
but the patent has expired. In that case, the original producer has reaped his reward of a 17year monopoly and the public has already ‘paid the congressionally mandated price for
disclosure.’” (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989))).
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courts as applied to copyright and design patents, both of which also involve
limited monopolies for a set term. In its 2003 opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
Court agreed to “demur” to the description of the Copyright Clause as
empowering Congress to enact a bargain through copyright legislation.70 But
the Court’s view of that bargain in Eldred entailed the claim that that past
authors would benefit from any extensions of copyright granted to future
authors; it did not strongly support the view that the “copyright bargain” was
between authors and the public. To the contrary, the Court noted that “our
references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent context,” in which
disclosure of the invention is the quo exchanged for the quid of patent
protection.71 By contrast, the Court suggested, because no disclosure is
required as a condition of securing copyright, the case for any quid pro quo in
the copyright context is weaker. Copyright law may be justified by the ultimate
goal of disseminating works of authorship to the public, but since the move in
the 1976 Copyright Act from publication to fixation as the triggering event for
protection, the diary tucked away in a desk drawer receives just as much
protection as the best-selling novel. Thus, there is now nothing beyond creation
that the author need do in order to receive copyright protection, and so
whatever agreement exists cannot truly be characterized as “If you create for
the public’s benefit, we will give you these rights.” Rather, the agreement is in
the nature of a reward: “Whenever you create in a particular way, you will get
these rights.”
As with copyright, design patents are offered as incentive for creation, not
disclosure or publication. Unlike with utility patents, the public does not need
the patentee to explain how the invention works; the subject matter of a design
patent is apparent to all who view the article. The goal of the design patent
scheme, therefore, is to generate creative activity for the ultimate aesthetic
benefit of the public, and the right is in the nature of a reward for so doing,
although examination narrows the class of creators who may benefit.72
Nevertheless, in a 1947 opinion, the Second Circuit took the view that the
end of the design patent term worked a dedication of the design to the public
domain.73 The plaintiff had brought suit against the defendant, alleging that the
defendant’s sale of cologne in a particular bottle constituted unfair competition
based on the plaintiff’s common law trademark rights in the shape of the bottle
(what we would now term trade dress); the plaintiff had also held two design
patents for the bottle shape that had since expired.74 The Second Circuit
70. 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003).
71. Id. at 216.
72. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1872) (“It is the

appearance itself . . . no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not
entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.”).
73. See Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., Inc., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947).
74. Id. at 396.
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rejected the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had shown neither secondary
meaning nor confusion, but it went on to discuss approvingly the district
court’s view that the plaintiff should not be allowed to assert trademark rights
at all in light of the expired patent:
A patent is the grant of a temporary monopoly to the patentee; at its expiration
all are free to use the invention. During the life of the patent a purchaser will
naturally associate the produce with the producer, since the patent prevents
others from producing. But such association does not furnish justification for
an extension of such protection unlimited in time. . . .What cases there are
clearly indicate that the expiration of a design patent effects a dedication of
that design to the public.75

The court went on to distinguish material in the public domain that had never
been patented, noting: “If in return for the statutory monopoly for a term the
patentee is held thereafter to dedicate his invention to the public, it would
naturally follow that where he has never had this monopoly he has nothing to
give up.”76 This is therefore a strong version of the quid pro quo argument: If
the plaintiff has taken advantage of the patent system, it agrees to cede trade
dress rights; if it chooses to market the product without seeking a patent, it
cedes the patent rights but not trade dress rights.
But thirty years later, this view appeared to have changed. In In re Yardley,
discussed earlier,77 the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals rejected the quid
pro quo argument as a basis for denying concurrent design patent and copyright
protection. “[T]he mere fact that the copyright will persist beyond the term of
any design patent which may be granted,” the court held, “does not provide a
sound basis for rejecting appellant’s design patent application.”78 Indeed, the
court rejected the analogy to contract (through the use of the concept “failure of
consideration”), noting that a patent should be governed by property principles,
not by contract principles.79 The court took a similar view in its decision in In
re Honeywell, Inc.80 the same year. In that case, Honeywell had appealed from
the decision of the TTAB refusing registration of its thermostat configuration
on the grounds that the configuration had been the subject matter of an expired
design patent. The CCPA reversed, noting the “clear distinction between the
underlying bases of the federal trademark and design patent laws”:
[T]he public interest—protection from confusion, mistake, and deception in
the purchase of goods and services—must prevail over any alleged extension
of design patent rights, when a trademark is non-functional and does in fact
serve as a means to distinguish the goods of the trademark owner from those

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 397-98 (citation omitted).
Id. at 398.
See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
Id.
497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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of others.81

This perspective highlights the second aspect of the “right to copy”/quid
pro quo argument that merits further analysis. Even if we view patent law or
copyright law as embodying a contractual agreement that once the term expires,
the subject matter of the copyright or patent is dedicated to the public, we
should be clear about what we mean by “subject matter.” The right to copy or
use the inventive aspect of an article covered by a design patent or the creative
aspect of a work of authorship covered by copyright does not necessarily entail
a right to be free from trademark and unfair competition law’s requirement to
avoid consumer confusion. The right to copy a pharmaceutical no longer under
patent, for example, does not give the copier the right to label the drug in
whatever manner it desires; likewise, the right to copy a painting no longer
under copyright does not give the copier the right to unfettered access via
breaking into a museum after hours to set up her easel. Indeed, this is the lesson
with respect to unfair competition law specifically in a line of cases from the
Court, all of which permit the competitor to copy the subject matter of an
expired patent but impose an affirmative obligation on the competitor’s part to
label its goods or otherwise make clear to consumers the source of
manufacture.
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., an 1896 case, the
Supreme Court was faced with a number of sewing machines manufactured by
the Singer Manufacturing Company on which the patent had expired.82 The
defendant had manufactured virtually identical machines for sale and, in so
doing, had not only called them “Singer” machines but had also copied certain
of the labeling that the Singer company had used. The Court held, first, that the
expiration of the patent meant that the defendant, like any member of the
public, had the “right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent,” as it is
“upon this condition that the patent is granted.”83 Second, the Court held that
this grant to the public included not only the form of the object but also the
generic name of the object, even if that name had been developed or invented
by the former patent holder or was the surname of the patentee. “To say
otherwise,” said the Court, “would be to hold that although the public had
81. Id. at 1348. On remand, the TTAB held that the feature that Honeywell attempted
to register was de jure functional; the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals affirmed that
finding. In re Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180, 181 (C.C.P.A. 1976); see also Krueger Int’l,
Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Sotomayor, J.) (“When a
design patent expires, the design becomes copyable. It may not, however, be copied in such
a way that customers are deceived about what they are buying.”), overruled on other
grounds by Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.2d 373, 378 n.3 (2d Cir.
1997). Notably, Krueger was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), that product design could not be
inherently distinctive trade dress.
82. 163 U.S. 169, 169 (1896).
83. Id. at 185.
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acquired the device covered by the patent, yet the owner of the patent or the
manufacturer of the patented thing had retained the designated name which was
essentially necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that which
had become theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly.”84 However, the
Court also held that the same public interest that supported the dedication of the
formerly patented object to the public also supported the principle that such use
carried a duty to take such precautions “as will protect the property of others
and prevent injury to the public interest.”85 Thus, where the generic name also
served as a trademark in some instances, the failure to clearly indicate the
source of manufacture would be an improper act that would both harm the
goodwill of the mark holder and risk deceiving the public. “[T]o compel,” the
Court wrote, “the one who uses the name after the expiration of the patent, to
indicate that the articles are made by himself, in no way impairs the right of
use, but simply regulates and prevents wrong to individuals and injury to the
public.”86
In the case at hand, the Court held that while the defendant’s
advertisements made clear that the machines it sold were from the June
Manufacturing Company, the machines themselves did not contain sufficient
notice of their source, both via acts of omission and via acts of commission. For
example, the Court noted that an oval plate on the machines contained the
words “Improved Singer” but did not contain anything to indicate that the
machines were made by the defendant. Similarly, the Court highlighted that a
marking on the legs of the stand contained the word “Singer” in bold with
“I.S.” above and “J. Mfg. Co.” in small letters. “The similarity between the
letter J. and the letter S., the failure to state in full the name of the
manufacturer, the general resemblance to the device of the Singer Company,
the place where it was put, which had no necessary connection with the
structure or working capacity of the machines, and the prominence of the
casting of the word ‘Singer’ in comparison with the other mark,” the Court
noted, “bring out in the plainest way the purpose of suppressing knowledge of
the actual manufacturer, and suggesting that it was made by the Singer

84. Id.
85. Id. at 186.
86. Id. at 187; see also id. at 199-200 (“[W]here, during the life of a monopoly created

by a patent, a name, whether it be arbitrary or be that of the inventor, has become, by his
consent, either express or tacit, the identifying and generic name of the thing patented, this
name passes to the public with the cessation of the monopoly which the patent created.
Where another avails himself of this public dedication to make the machine and use the
generic designation, he can do so in all forms, with the fullest liberty, by affixing such name
to the machines, by referring to it in advertisements and by other means, subject, however, to
the condition that the name must be so used as not to deprive others of their rights or to
deceive the public, and, therefore, that the name must be accompanied with such indications
that the thing manufactured is the work of the one making it, as will unmistakably inform the
public of that fact.”).
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Company.”87 Thus, concluded the Court, because the defendant had the right to
use the word “Singer,” “it is plain that the infringement only resulted from the
failure to plainly state along with the use of that word the source of
manufacture.”88 The Court reversed and remanded, with directions to enter an
injunction enjoining the defendant from using the word Singer “without clearly
and unmistakably stating in all said advertisements that the machines are made
by the defendant, as distinguished from the sewing machines made by the
Singer Manufacturing Company.”89
In a companion case decided the same day,90 the Court held that although
the defendant was legally permitted to sell the sewing machines at issue and to
use the name Singer in doing so, he could not engage in other activity that
would likely deceive consumers into believing that the machines were made by
the Singer Manufacturing Company, such as including a brass plate with the
lettering “New York S.M. Mfg. Co.” that resembled Singer’s own brass
plates.91 The Court thus reversed the order of the lower court in the defendant’s
favor and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of Singer,
enjoining the defendant from
marking upon sewing machines made or sold by him, or upon any plate or
device connected therewith or attached thereto, the word ‘Singer,” or words or
letters equivalent thereto, without clearly and unmistakably specifying in
connection therewith that such machines are the product of the defendant or
other manufacturer, and not the manufacture of the Singer Manufacturing
Company.92

In both Singer cases, then, the Court suggested that even though the defendants
were availing themselves of the right to use what had then become a generic
term—a word that, essentially, the defendants had a “right to copy”—they
could not do so without taking additional steps to minimize consumer
confusion in the marketplace.
One might argue that the Singer cases do not truly implicate any limitations
on the “right to copy,” since the apparent consumer confusion emanated only
from the use of the word “Singer” and not from the shape of the formerly
patented machines. But Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,93 in which the
Court considered an unfair competition suit brought by National Biscuit

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 201.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bent, 163 U.S. 205 (1896).
Id. at 206 (“It is plain that the position and size as well as the inscription found on
these devices were calculated to deceive by creating the impression, on one not familiar with
all the details of the marks of the Singer Manufacturing Company, that they were the marks
of that company.”).
92. Id. at 207.
93. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
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Company against Kellogg Company over Kellogg’s sale of shredded wheat
breakfast cereal in the form of a pillow-shaped biscuit, provides more context
in this regard. The process of manufacturing shredded wheat had previously
been protected by a utility patent and the pillow shape by a design patent; the
utility patent had expired and the design patent was declared invalid one year
before its expiration.94 Accordingly, Kellogg argued that it had the right not
only to manufacture cereal in a pillow-shaped form but also to call it “shredded
wheat,” the term that National Biscuit Company had been using. National
Biscuit Company did not deny that Kellogg had the right to use the formerly
patented process but alleged that both the pillow-shaped form and the term
“shredded wheat” continued to have trademark significance and that Kellogg’s
use constituted passing off.95 The Court, citing Singer v. June, held that when
the patent expired on the process of making shredded wheat, the generic
designation of the patented product also passed to the public.96 Nevertheless,
the Court continued, the fact that some residual association between the term
and the plaintiff might exist—what we today would call de facto secondary
meaning—entitled the plaintiff to demand that the defendant “use reasonable
care to inform the public of the source of its product.”97 This would have been
true even if Kellogg had not used the term “shredded wheat” but had availed
itself only of the right to copy the biscuit shape: “Kellogg Company was free to
use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to the obligation to identify its product
lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”98 And this the Court held that
Kellogg had done: Given that virtually all of Kellogg’s shredded wheat was
sold to consumer in cartons, which were clearly marked with the Kellogg name,
Kellogg had indeed taken reasonable care to prevent consumer confusion, even
if some small degree of confusion might remain.99
What are now known as the Sears/Compco cases make the point even more
starkly: Even when patent law grants the right to copy an article, a court may
require additional labeling, disclaimers, or other statements pursuant to unfair
competition law to mitigate consumer confusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., decided in 1964, Stiffel brought suit against Sears for infringement
of Stiffel’s utility and design patents on a pole lamp and for state unfair
competition, on the grounds that by selling a substantially identical lamp, Sears
had confused consumers as to the source of the lamp.100 The district court held
the patent invalid for lack of invention, a ruling that was not challenged on
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 119 n.4.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118-19 (“The only obligation resting upon Kellogg Company was to identify
its own product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”).
98. Id. at 120.
99. Id. at 120-22.
100. 376 U.S. 225, 225-26 (1964).
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appeal, so the question was whether the sale of an object substantially similar to
an unpatented item could be the basis of an unfair competition claim.101 In
holding that it could not, the Court was concerned with using state unfair
competition law as an end-run around the federal patent laws. Federal patent
law, the Court held, embodies a congressional policy of “granting patents only
to true inventions, and then only for a limited time,” after which the “right to
make the article—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried
when patented—passes to the public.”102 Thus, a suit based on nothing more
than the identical appearance of the two lamps was an impermissible patent
suit, not an unfair competition suit, but a state “may, in appropriate
circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled
or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being
misled as to the source [of the goods].”103 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., was decided the same day to the same effect.104
Two related aspects of the Court’s opinions in Sears/Compco are worth
highlighting. First, the Court was careful to note the different purposes and
goals of the different intellectual property regimes: patent law governs the right
to make the patented article, while unfair competition law governs source
identification. Second, the Court was sensitive to the attempt to circumvent the
boundaries of one intellectual property regime by denominating the claim as
something else. The state claim at issue, although characterized as an unfair
competition claim, was in reality an attempt to prevent the copying of the lamp,
full stop, and thus was really a patent-like claim.
Both of these aspects were present in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc.,105 decided in 1989. In that case, the Court considered the validity
of a Florida statute enacted in 1983 that made it unlawful to “use the direct
molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured vessel
hull or component part of a vessel made by another without the written
permission of that other person.”106 The plaintiff company, which had
marketed a successful hull design for over seven years without patent
protection, filed suit under the statute in 1984, alleging that the defendant had
unlawfully duplicated its hull design. The defendant argued that the statute was
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it
conflicted with federal patent law, in that it provided patent-like protection to
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 232.
376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964) (“And of course a State cannot hold a copier
accountable in damages for failure to label or otherwise to identify his goods unless his
failure is in violation of valid state statutory or decisional law requiring the copier to label or
take other precautions to prevent confusion of customers as to the source of the goods.”).
105. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
106. Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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an article that, because it had already been marketed to the public without
protection, was in the public domain and so was free to be copied.107 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that “state regulation of intellectual property
must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in
our patent laws.”108 Since federal law mandates that the subject matter of an
expired patent (or subject matter that was never patented) be free to copy,
Florida’s statute to the contrary was preempted.109
The Court’s holding relied on three intellectual steps. First, the Court’s
characterization of federal law depended on a quid pro quo argument. The
limited term of the patent is offered in exchange for disclosure of the invention
to the public; thus, there is no agreement, and federal patent law does not
prevent copying, where the subject matter has already been disclosed to the
market or the patent term has expired.110 Second, state law interferes with this
determination when it provides patent-like protection to unprotectable subject
matter, even if the statute is in name an unfair competition law.111 The Florida
statute, for example, was not limited to instances of consumer confusion or
passing off; it was “aimed directly at preventing the exploitation of the design
and utilitarian conceptions embodied in the product itself” in order to induce
improvement in boat hull designs.112 And finally, as in the cases already
discussed, the Court noted that the states were free to offer limited protection—
such as protection against consumer confusion as to source—that did not
interfere with the federal patent scheme.113
The case law just recounted holds that the “right to copy” afforded by
patent law and copyright is just that: a right to copy the subject matter that was
formerly the subject of patent or copyright protection, but not a freedom from
additional requirements necessary to remedy unfair competition violations.
Two more recent cases, however—TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
See id. at 150-51 (“The federal patent system . . . embodies a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances
in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years.”); id. at 156 (“[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and
Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are
subject to appropriation without significant restraint.”).
111. Id. at 157 (“It is readily apparent that the Florida statute does not operate to
prohibit ‘unfair competition’ in the usual sense that the term is understood.”).
112. Id. at 158; see also id. at 160 (“In essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire
public from engaging in a form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain.
This is clearly one of the rights vested in the federal patent holder, but has never been a part
of state protection under the law of unfair competition or trade secrets.”).
113. See id. at 166-67 (noting that the very existence of section 43 of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), indicates Congress’s recognition that unfair competition law and patent
law can coexist).
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Inc.,114 and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.115—must be
distinguished. Like the earlier cases, TrafFix involved an unfair competition
suit against a competitor who copied the subject matter of an expired patent (a
dual-spring stand for outdoor road signs).116 The Court likewise ruled in favor
of the defendant, but beyond noting that the defendant was not required to hide
from public view the technology it copied,117 the Court did not consider any
affirmative obligation on the defendant’s part to dispel consumer confusion.
This omission, however, was not surprising, since the focus in TrafFix was on
evidentiary, not doctrinal matters. As the case involved the “well-established
rule that trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are
functional,”118 the question before the Court was whether the plaintiff had
satisfied its burden to show that the dual-spring mechanism for which it
claimed trade dress protection was not functional. Indeed, the Court specifically
declined to accept suggestions from TrafFix and two of its supporting amici
that the Court rest its holding on the patent bargain’s “right to copy” that
provided the foundation for the Court’s holding in Singer v. June.119
Dastar, by contrast, did specifically invoke the quid pro quo of Sears and
Kellogg. At issue in the case was a television series that was no longer under
copyright and thus was free for all to copy. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant’s marketing of the series on videotape under its own name
constituted unfair competition (in the form of reverse passing off).120 Recalling
the line of cases just discussed, the Court held, not surprisingly, that the
defendant was free to copy the formerly protected work.121 But it also added,
contrary to those cases, that the defendant had no obligation to engage in
labeling that would lessen consumer confusion as to the source of manufacture,
assuming that the source for a communicative good is the author of the work.
Indeed, the Court held, to require any such labeling would “create a species of
mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to ‘copy and to use’
expired copyrights.’”122

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

532 U.S. 23 (2001).
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
532 U.S. at 25-26.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 35 (“If, despite the rule that functional features may not be the subject of
trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of
an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to consider the matter.”).
120. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26-27.
121. Id. at 33-34, 38.
122. Id. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
165 (1989)); see also id. at 33 (“The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a
copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the
public.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
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Contrary to the cases just discussed, Dastar involved a communicative or
intellectual product rather than a physical one; as a result, it presents
complicated and different questions of copying and production.123 As noted,
however, each of the previous cases held that mandating limited relief under
the Lanham Act would not interfere with the right to copy formerly protected
material; indeed, Kellogg characterized reasonable efforts to eliminate
consumer confusion under those circumstances as an obligation.124 But because
of the particular facts of Dastar, its posture as a reverse passing off case, and
the sweeping nature of its holding, the Court had no need to inquire into the
effect on consumers of the defendant’s existing labeling.125 Thus, despite
Dastar’s broad characterization of the case law on which it relied, its holding
should be seen as dependent on the particular circumstances in that case and
not as a complete repudiation of the precedent holding that the right to copy
does not absolve one of the obligation to minimize consumer confusion.126
What is important to recognize about TrafFix and Dastar, however, is the
likely reason that the Court in those cases suggested (if only by omission in
TrafFix) that the defendant had no obligation even to consider unfair
competition principles. In both cases, the plaintiff was characterized as a bad

230 (1964))).
123. In other words, although the defendant in Kellogg was permitted, once the patent
no longer pertained, to do what patent law formerly prohibited—making and selling the
article without prior authorization—unfair competition law might still have required some
labeling as to the fact that it was the defendant, and not the plaintiff, that was doing it. See
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938). Analogously, the defendant in
Dastar was permitted, once the copyright expired, to do what copyright law formerly
prohibited: making decisions about how the work would be used and distributed (questions
of fair use and other defenses aside). Similarly, then, unfair competition law might still have
required the defendant to engage in labeling to inform consumers that it, and not the
plaintiff, was responsible for those decisions. The fact that Dastar was a reverse passing-off
case, and not a traditional passing-off case, complicates the analogy.
124. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120; see also, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded
Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding that
where the defendant uses the same generic term as the plaintiff, “the subsequent competitor
cannot be prevented from using the generic term to denote itself or its product, but it may be
enjoined from passing itself or its product off as the first organization or its product. Thus, a
court may require the competitor to take whatever steps are necessary to distinguish itself or
its product from the first organization or its product,” and proceeding to cite cases).
125. Part of the difficulty is that the previous cases concerned claims of passing off,
where the defendant’s obligation could consist merely of affirmatively identifying itself as
the manufacturer of the goods. The Dastar Court’s concern in the reverse passing off case at
issue there was that it would be difficult to determine what an appropriate disclosure should
look like. The Court resolved these practical difficulties by interpreting “origin of goods” in
section 43(a) to refer to the physical good (the videotape), not the communicative content it
contained, thus rendering Dastar’s representation of source not misleading. 539 U.S. at
35-37.
126. For a thoughtful consideration of Dastar’s implications at the copyright/trademark
interface, see Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357 (2012).
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actor, attempting to use unfair competition law to achieve a patent- or
copyright-related goal that was unavailable under those doctrines. In arguing as
counsel for TrafFix at the Court, now-Justice Roberts framed the issue in the
case as follows:
But then MDI’s patents expired, as under the Constitution all patents
eventually must. Sometime thereafter, TrafFix Devices, the petitioner, copied
MDI’s stand, added some improvements of its own, and marketed a competing
version. No longer armed with its patents, MDI tried a new tack to exclude
competition. It claimed that the configuration of its stand, the same dualspring design that it had touted as patent-protected during the term of the
patents, was protected as trade dress and could not be copied.127

Similarly, Twentieth-Century Fox, the plaintiff in Dastar, was almost certainly
trying to make up for the failure to renew the copyright in the work at issue,
which failure had allowed the work to fall into the public domain in the first
place. Indeed, the Second Circuit has read TrafFix and Dastar in precisely this
way, noting that these cases suggest the general principle “that intellectual
property owners should not be permitted to recategorize one form of
intellectual property as another, thereby extending the duration of protection
beyond that which Congress deemed appropriate for their actual creative
efforts . . . .”128
Thus, we see in the Court’s jurisprudence two related principles. First,
there is no general bar to asserting one category of intellectual property claims
even when another category would permit the defendant’s activity. The fact
that patent law would permit the defendant to copy the subject matter at issue
does not mean that the defendant might not also be required, in appropriate
circumstances, to label the article so as to make its source clear. (We must
obviously count Dastar as an exception to this principle at the
copyright/trademark interface, despite its inconsistency with precedent.)
Second, courts are (and, I will argue, should be) attentive to instances in which
the assertion of a claim is remote from the interest at the heart of the doctrine at
issue. Where the courts sense that plaintiffs are attempting an end-run around
the limitations of a particular legal doctrine, they often prevent those plaintiffs
from continuing to assert their claims. I discuss this phenomenon—which is
typically termed “misuse” in the intellectual property realm—in the next
Subpart.

127. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23 (2001), (No. 99-1571), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-1571.pdf.
128. Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005);
see also IQ Group, Ltd. v. Wiesner Publ’g, LLC, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592-93 (D.N.J. 2006)
(rejecting interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)’s reference to “copyright management
information” to include company logo on the grounds that plaintiff “should not be permitted
to recategorize its mark so as to invoke copyright protection”).
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C. Overlapping Rights and Remedies129
Originally existing as an equitable doctrine only in patent law, the viability
of the misuse doctrine in copyright law has since been well established, albeit
not in every federal circuit.130 In both intellectual property areas, the doctrine
derives from the “unclean hands” principle used as an equitable backstop in
many areas of law. The justification is, generally, that a plaintiff who has taken
the benefit of the public grant provided by copyright and/or patent law should
not be allowed to enforce the limited monopoly in court when, as against the
defendant in the case or as against other entities, it has overreached in
exercising those rights.131
The case typically identified as the landmark patent misuse doctrine is
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,132 in which the Court held that the
holder of a patent on a salt-depositing machine could not assert its patent
against an alleged infringer where the patent holder had required licensees to

129. The following three paragraphs are largely taken from Heymann, supra note 22, at

90-93.

130. The doctrine has been recognized by courts in almost every circuit (some
expressly, some more hypothetically). See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204-06 (3d Cir. 2003); Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc.,
166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d
516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-77 (4th Cir.
1990); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610-12 (8th Cir. 1988);
Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enters., Inc., No. 03 CIV 9944 (GEL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26143, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005); Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc.,
332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17-20 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 1070, 1113-14 (D. Kan. 2000).
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits remain more equivocal. See Garcia-Goyco v.
Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 428 F.3d 14, 21 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005) (“This court has not yet
recognized misuse of a copyright as a defense to infringement.”); Telecom Tech. Servs. v.
Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 831 (11th Cir. 2004) (avoiding decision as to whether to recognize
a copyright misuse defense); Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distribs., Inc., 115 F. Supp.
2d 800, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (finding that defendants had failed to raise a material issue of
fact with respect to copyright misuse).
131. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Daniel Moylan, The Evolving Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 269, 269 (Peter
Yu ed., 2007); Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1113
(2003); Ralph D. Clifford, Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secret Claims: Can the
Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent Constitutional Doublethink?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 247, 287
(2000); Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming
Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 514
(2004); Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and
First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1304-07 (1991); Kathryn Judge, Note,
Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904 (2004); David Scher, Note, The
Viability of the Copyright Misuse Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 101 (1993).
132. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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use its machine only in conjunction with the patent holder’s (unpatented) salt
tablets.133 Equitable considerations should bar the patent infringement suit, the
Court held, because the patent monopoly is granted as a “special privilege” that
includes as an unstated term the obligation to assert that privilege only in a
manner consistent with public policy—specifically, the exclusion from the
patent grant of anything not included with the patented invention.134 Thus, a
patentee that uses its monopoly in the patented article to acquire a monopoly in
an unpatented article should be forbidden from enforcing its patent at all until
the misuse ends.
Courts have on occasion deployed the misuse doctrine to prevent copyright
owners from asserting copyright in ways that seem far removed from the
economic interests traditionally seen to be at the core of copyright law, even
when antitrust interests are not at stake, as they were in Morton Salt.135 For
example, in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., a 2011 decision, the
plaintiff luxury watchmaker engraved a small design on the reverse side of its
watches in order to be able to assert that the unauthorized importation of those
watches by a discount store constituted copyright infringement.136 The court
granted summary judgment on the infringement claim to the defendant, holding
that Omega misused its copyright in the design in order to control the
importation of the watches.137
We might also characterize as motivated by misuse-like considerations the
instances in which courts push back against perceived end-runs around
doctrinal limitations. One example from outside the intellectual property realm
is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.138 The Reverend Jerry Falwell, a nationally
known minister who often commented on public issues, brought suit against
Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt. The suit was over a parody
advertisement on the inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of the
133. Id. at 492.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC, 350 F.3d at 647 (contending that the

doctrine is appropriate where a plaintiff uses a copyright infringement suit to obtain property
protection (for example, in data) “that copyright law clearly does not confer”); Video
Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205-06 (asserting that the doctrine is potentially appropriate where the
copyright holder uses an infringement suit “to restrict expression that is critical of it”)
(dicta); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 131, at 274 (noting that courts have used the
copyright misuse doctrine “to reinforce subject matter limitations and channeling doctrines
that maintain boundaries”); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and
Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115,
124 (1997). Relatedly, Dan Burk articulates an additional function for misuse: “preserving
the courts from the reputational damage of enforcing legal claims that might be technically
legitimate but which would lead to socially perverse outcomes.” Burk, supra note 131, at
1133.
136. No. CV 04-05443 TJH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155893, at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
137. Id. at *4.
138. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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magazine. Based on ads for Campari Liqueur that featured celebrities talking
about their “first time” (the meaning was the first time they had tried Campari,
although the double entendre was surely obvious), the parody ad had Falwell
stating that his “first time” was “during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse.”139 In his complaint, Falwell alleged that the ad
constituted an invasion of privacy, libel, and an intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court directed a verdict in Hustler’s favor on the
privacy claim, and the jury found for the magazine on the defamation claim,
concluding that the ad could not reasonably be understood to state actual facts;
the jury found for Falwell on the emotional distress claim.140 The issue before
the Court, then, was whether the First Amendment limitations applicable to the
defamation claim after Times v. Sullivan,141 based on Falwell’s position as a
public figure, would apply equally to the emotional distress claim based on the
same material. In holding that such limitations did apply, the Court focused on
the public interest in engaging in debate about public affairs and the “breathing
room” necessary to afford free debate that motivated the rule in Times v.
Sullivan, an interest that would be thwarted if public figures could evade First
Amendment limitations by changing the name of their claim.142
Another example is Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, in
which the Seventh Circuit, having reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff
corporation’s count alleging defamation based on a television broadcast,
affirmed the dismissal of the count alleging wrongful interference with business
relations based on the same broadcast.143 The court noted that “[a]ny libel of
corporation can be made to resemble in a general way this archetypal wrongfulinterference case,” in that the allegation would be that the defamation caused
customers to stop doing business with it.144 But the court saw such allegations
as an attempt to evade the limitations attendant to defamation doctrine, noting
in particular that it was evident that the plaintiff did not believe that the
broadcaster had any intent other than to increase viewership and so could not
truly articulate the kind of harm that underlies a wrongful interference claim.145
One final example (perhaps not coincidentally, also from the Seventh

139. Id. at 48.
140. Id. at 48-49.
141. The Court had held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that

in order for a public figure to recover for the harm caused by a defamatory falsehood, he or
she had to show that the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280.
142. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53-56.
143. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273-74 (7th Cir.
1983).
144. Id. at 273.
145. Id. at 273-74.
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Circuit) is J.H. Desnick, M.D. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.146
Desnick involved an ophthalmic clinic and two of its doctors who brought suit
against a television network and others over an undercover report that claimed
that the clinic performed unnecessary cataract surgery on its patients. The
plaintiffs brought suit primarily for defamation, based on the content of the
broadcast, and for trespass, on the grounds that the plaintiffs would never have
granted permission to the undercover reporters (who were posing as patients)
had their true motives been known.147 After holding that the lower court
improperly dismissed the defamation claim,148 the Seventh Circuit held that, by
contrast, the trespass claim was properly dismissed. The harm allegedly
suffered by the plaintiffs—a reputational harm based on the accusations in the
broadcast—was a defamation-type harm. That harm might have been facilitated
by the entry onto the plaintiff’s property, but the plaintiffs were not truly
complaining about an injury to the inviolability of their land ownership.149 (We
can assume that the plaintiffs would not have complained if the television
broadcast had been favorable, even though such a broadcast would have
resulted from the same unauthorized entrance onto the plaintiffs’ property.)150
Put otherwise, in the Seventh Circuit’s words, “[t]here was no invasion in the
present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to
protect.”151 The upshot of these cases, then, is not a conclusion that the plaintiff
has no emotional distress, interference with business relations, or trespass rights
to assert whatsoever; rather, it is a determination that the nature of the harm
asserted in the cases at hand did not align with those interests.152
146. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). Perhaps also not coincidentally, both the Brown &
Williamson opinion and the Desnick opinion were authored by Judge Posner.
147. Id. at 1347-49.
148. See id. at 1351.
149. Id. at 1352-53.
150. As Saul Levmore points out, a positive story was not likely one that the network
would have had an interest in broadcasting. Saul Levmore, Judging Deception, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1779, 1786 (2007).
151. J.H. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194
F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), yielded a different result but that result is reconcilable. Food Lion
also involved undercover reporting by a news organization; the plaintiff also brought a claim
for trespass, among other things. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of trespass
(and award of $1.00 in nominal damages) based on the fact that the reporters, who had posed
as employees, breached their duty of loyalty by secretly taping in nonpublic areas. Id. at 518.
Although the cases are not cleanly distinguishable, it is easier to conclude that the plaintiff’s
objection was to the presence of reporters in nonpublic areas, not simply the nature of what
was said about the reporters’ observations afterwards. Additionally, the court made clear that
the plaintiff could not, under Hustler v. Falwell, collect defamation-type damages under the
state law claims without the application of First Amendment principles. Id. at 523.
152. See J.H. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (investigative newsgathering “is entitled to all
the safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it
is entitled to them regardless of the name of the tort . . . .”); see also Berghoff v. R.J. Frisby
Mfg. Co., 720 F. Supp. 649, 656 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[T]he fact that similar damages are
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This case law suggests that one solution to the overlap problem in
intellectual property law, including overlaps involving design patents, is not to
require the rights holder to elect one form of protection at the outset but rather
to encourage courts to be attentive to end-runs by calibrating remedies to the
nature of the harm incurred.153 How then might courts go about determining
whether the plaintiff is engaging in an end-run? The cases offer some
suggestions. First, courts might attempt to divine the nature of the harm that the
plaintiff seeks to remedy, in part by considering the course of conduct or
litigation history. The Omega case is one such example, in which the court’s
consideration of Omega’s course of conduct led it to the conclusion that Omega
had brought an impermissible trademark infringement suit dressed in copyright
infringement clothing.154 Second, courts might look at the relationship between
the right asserted and the remedy sought. For example, if the plaintiff is
bringing suit for infringement of trade dress where a design patent exists or has
expired, a court should assess the viability of limited injunctive relief, such as a
disclaimer or label, before considering broader, patent-like remedies, such as an
injunction against distribution.155
As an example, consider the dispute in Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc.,
mentioned earlier.156 Kohler and Moen are competitors in the field of faucets
and faucet handles. Moen successfully obtained trade dress registration for the
shape of some of its faucets, based on what the court characterized as

recoverable for different torts indicates that the nature of the injury, not the types of damages
recoverable, determines the cause of action and, consequently, the appropriate statute of
limitations.” (footnote omitted)); Aequitron Med., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 704, 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (tortious interference with prospective business relationship claim); Evans
v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 601 A.2d 330, 333 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“[W]here the underlying
wrong which the complaint alleges is defamation by publication of a libelous report, and the
claim of injury set out in each count springs from the act of publication, the Appellants
should not be able to circumvent the statute of limitations by merely terming the claim
tortious interference when in essence it is one of defamation, subject to a one year limitation
of action. In such a situation, we will look to the gravamen of the action, not to the label
applied to it by plaintiffs.”)
153. Cf. David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent—The Dilemma of Confusion, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 289, 306 (1999) (“It is not the function of trademark to protect designers
against copying per se. Properly understood, the function of trademark law is to protect the
reputation of the mark owner and to provide accurate information to potential purchasers.”).
154. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV 04-05443 TJH, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 155893), at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]fter [dealers authorized by Omega] in the
United States complained to Omega about Costco’s sale of Omega watches at discounted
prices, Omega’s legal department suggested that Omega use a copyrighted design to control
the importation and distribution of its watches into the United States.”).
155. Dratler, supra note 28, at 935 n.237 (“The point is that protection under trademark
principles does not remove an industrial design or product configuration from the public
domain but merely proscribes those methods of copying it that unfairly usurp the originator’s
goodwill.”).
156. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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“substantial evidence” that purchasers recognized the faucets as Moen faucets
due to their distinctive shape alone, without any additional markings.157 Kohler
challenged the registration on the grounds, inter alia, that a product shape
should not be able to be registered as trade dress under the Lanham Act because
the potentially unlimited term of trade dress protection would directly conflict
with the limited term awarded to configurations under design patent law, which
was, in Kohler’s view, the proper protective regime in this case. The Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that design patent law and trademark
law were directed toward different ends and required different evidence in
order to take advantage of the rights provided. Accordingly, the court
concluded, “Kohler is free to copy Moen’s design so long as it insures that the
public is not thereby deceived or confused into believing that its copy is a
Moen faucet.”158
Assume, then, that Moen had obtained a design patent for the ornamental
aspects of its faucet; assume further that the patent had expired, and that Kohler
then wanted to copy the design. One pragmatic objection to the court’s
statement would be that Moen would likely argue that the mere copying of the
design is likely to confuse consumers into believing that the Kohler faucet is a
Moen faucet, given the distinctiveness that the Moen faucet acquired during the
design patent term. Moreover, the argument would continue, the fact that the
Kohler faucet would be sold in packaging clearly indicating the source of the
faucet would not be sufficient to remedy any post-sale confusion arising once
the faucets were installed. (Indeed, the post-sale confusion doctrine complicates
things considerably, and courts would be well advised to reconsider its scope, if
not its viability.)159 Here, therefore, is where it would be incumbent on courts
to calibrate remedies particularly carefully. Kohler would be free, upon the
expiration of the design patent, to copy the formerly patented design, and any
request by Moen for an injunction to cease sales of the design should be denied.
But Kellogg and similar cases suggest that Kohler has an affirmative obligation
to take reasonable steps to minimize confusion. If a likelihood of confusion is
shown, Kohler need not, after TrafFix, change or conceal the design in some
way, but perhaps it might be directed to add a small marking directly to the
faucet that indicates that the faucet is a Kohler faucet and not a Moen faucet.
This seems to be an appropriate way to balance Kohler’s right to compete in the

157. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 1993).
158. Id. at 640 n.10.
159. Dratler, supra note 28, at 970 (“Taken together, the trends toward increasing

recognition of post-sale confusion and greater emphasis on confusion as to sponsorship or
affiliation may make it more difficult to frame and enforce commercially effective, and not
merely token, disclaimers of affiliation when a copyist borrows an innovator’s design
features.”); Welkowitz, supra note 153, at 329 (“Post-sale confusion stretches trademark law
beyond consumer protection to openly protecting designs from the act of copying, i.e., as
ordinary intellectual property, rather than unfair competition.”).
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market for attractive faucet designs with the consumer’s interest in having
accurate information as to the manufacturer of such designs.160
To be sure, there are administrative costs involved in such an approach. It
would be faster and less expensive to require intellectual property owners to
elect only one form of protection at the front end. But implementing such a
proposal would require a major overhaul of U.S. intellectual property law.
Being more attentive to the relationship among rights, harms, and remedies is
something that courts are well equipped and—as the cases above suggest—
even inclined to do. It reminds us that adjudication is, at its core, about
providing appropriate remedies for legally cognizable harm. In order to
accomplish that goal effectively, courts should not consider themselves to be
limited by the labels plaintiffs apply to their claims. Rather, courts should
consider the underlying nature of the harm asserted; only then can they identify
the remedy best designed to ameliorate that harm.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators are not wrong to focus attention on doctrinal
overlaps in intellectual property law. While it is true that such overlaps seem to
be the result of congressional intention (at least implicitly), such that
eliminating such overlaps as a structural matter would be inadvisable, the
adjudication of overlaps in any particular case is the natural role of the courts.
By ensuring that the gravamen of a claim, and not its label, is what drives any
potential remedy, the effect of these overlaps in practice can be mitigated.
As design patents continue to play more of a role in intellectual property
law, the overlap question is likely to arise more frequently, particularly given
that design patents feature the shortest (stated) term of all intellectual property
doctrines. It may well be then, that it will be a design patent case that focuses
our attention on the core goals of the various intellectual property doctrines and
helps to highlight the challenges that come with ever-expanding doctrinal
boundaries.

160. I recognize, of course, that the details matter here. It would not be appropriate, for
example, for a court to require a marking of a size or in a location that would frustrate
Kohler’s ability to benefit from the attractiveness of the design.
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